






The deterioriation and abandonment of housing units in U.S.
cities are creating problems of emerging urgency. Policies to
stem and reverse the forces of residential decay have been
implemented and have failed at a seemingly accelerating rate.
These events have been unfolding in the context of the widely
held view that an urgent shortage of appropriate housing for
low-income families exists. But is this view useful and valid in
understanding the economic forces at work in America’s cities?
Analysis and evidence presented in this paper suggest a
somewhat different interpretation. Suppliers of low-income
housing, whether private or public, are caught in a tightening
vise of steadily contracting demand and rising costs. Decreasing
demand, a perhaps surprising element in the analysis, reflects
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This paper is adapted from the text of a presentation
made August 6, 1971, at the Conference on Housing the Poor held at the
State University of New York at Albany (SUNYA J. A slightly revised
version will be included in the forthcoming volume, Housing the Poor,
edited by Donald J. Reeb and published by Praeger. The papers contained
in Housing the Poor deal with a variety of poverty-housing questions and
formed the basis for the conference.
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significant decreases in the number of poverty households both
black and white achieved in the decade of the 1960s. Rents, as a
result, rose less than did prices generally. Housing cost-factors-
operating, maintenance, interest, taxes-rose appreciably more,
at least double the increase in rents (40% or more, versus 20%).
What is the predictable supplier response to such conditions?
A cycle of reduced maintenance and tenant services followed
closely by residential and neighborhood decay seems an almost
inescapable conclusion. The first section of the paper provides
data on demand and cost factors affecting the housing market
in the past decade and briefly describes a model defining
supplier behavior for low-income housing.
Offsetting an &dquo;almost inescapable conclusion&dquo; poses the
challenge for public policy. The second section considers five
potential approaches to improving the quantity of quality
housing for low-income households:
(1) new construction,
(2) anti-deterioration subsidies,
(3) direct income subsidies,
(4) development of low-cost construction methods, and
(5) demolition.
Each of these approaches is evaluated in the context of
shrinking poverty demands for housing and expanding deteri-
oration incentives. Anti-deterioration and income subsidies
(including rent supplements) appear to constitute policies of
greatest appeal. However, the two approaches involve a degree
of conflict in goals between helping cities and helping the poor.
Patterns of residential segregation contribute to the problems
of resolving urban deterioration. Population redistributions
within SMSAs are the key to residential desegregation and, even
more importantly, to job availabilities and to coping with racial
imbalance in education. The last section notes the substantial
economic differentials between white and nonwhite households
that inhibit the achievement of more residentially integrated
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neighborhoods. A program of direct subsidies to pioneering
households, both black and white, willing to reside in integrated
neighborhoods is proposed as perhaps economically less expen-
sive and politically more feasible than other alternatives. Based
on 1970 data, approximately 3.5 million white and 3.5 million
nonwhite households would be involved in a housing &dquo;musical
chairs&dquo; process; the initiating costs might range between $7
billion and $14 billion.
Improving the quantity and quality of housing for low-
income households has an almost irresistible appeal unless one is
a curmudgeon (or perhaps an economist). The notion that a
vast, if not overwhelming, scarcity of &dquo;satisfactory&dquo; housing
confronts low-income families is viewed as so evident that no
documentation is needed. Many quotations citing the &dquo;obvious&dquo;
severity of the low-income housing problem could be presented.
The following quotations are illustrative. The President’s Com-
mittee on Urban Housing (1968: 40) noted that one of the
&dquo;two major challenges to the Nation ... [is] measures to relieve
the severe shortage of adequate housing for the poor.&dquo; The
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968: 257,
260; italics in original) described the situation in the following
terms:
Today after more than three decades of fragmented and grossly
under-funded Federal housing programs, decent housing remains a
chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban household.... The
supply of housing suitable for low-income families should be
expanded on a massive basis.
Some reflection suggests that the foregoing assessments do
not adequately describe the low-income housing market in the
United States, nor can they account for developments in this
market over the past decade. One is tempted to argue that
almost the reverse is the case; that is, the low-income market
has been threatened by underlying conditions of chronic
oversupply. At the same time, housing suppliers have had to
cope with substantially increasing costs.
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DEMAND AND COST FACTORS
On the demand side, the dominant force has been a strong,
persistent decline in the number of poor households. Between
1959 and 1969, the number of households (families and
unrelated individuals) below the revised official poverty defini-
tion of 1969 decreased almost 3.5 million to 9.8 million, or
26%.1 Decreases were experienced by both whites and non-
whites. Even inside central cities, the number of poverty
households contracted by more than 13%, or approximately
one-half the overall percentage decrease. Table 1 presents some
summary data detailing the shrinkage in low-income house-
holds.
The normal impact of a decrease in demand against a
relatively fixed standing stock, in the absence of offsetting
factors, is rising vacancy rates and softening rentals. To some
extent, evidence of these tendencies began to emerge in the first
half of the 1960s. Vacancies generally ranged between 7.5 and
8.0% and reports on local neighborhood vacancy rates of 15%
TABLE 1
TRENDS IN POVERTY HOUSEHOLDS
SOURCES: Poverty families and unrelated individuals: Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports, P-60, No. 77, &dquo;Consumer Income.&dquo;
Households-metropolitan: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-23,
No. 37, &dquo;Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population in Metropolitan and
Nonmetropolitan Areas: 1970 and 1960.&dquo;
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and higher were not infrequent. The sharp reductions in
residential building after 1965 served to mask the contraction in
low-income housing demand. If households with improving
incomes are to vacate their &dquo;lower-quality&dquo; for &dquo;higher-qual-
ity&dquo; units, there must be a release or &dquo;filtering&dquo; of units. This
release is dependent on the construction of new units in excess
of market growth.
Although dramatic, obvious symptoms of the decrease in
low-income demands may have been aborted, some less-direct
indications might be suggested. On an overall basis, and in a
relative price sense, rents did decline during the past decade.
The U.S. Consumer Price Index advanced 31.1 % between 1960
and 1970, while the rent component increased only 20.1 %.2
This experience of relative decreases in rent was widespread,
occurring in 22 of the 25 cities reported on by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.3 3 Direct observations on low-income rental
trends would be useful. However, it can be noted that recent
data show vacancy rates on low-rental units average 35% to 70%
above the rates for all units, supporting the hypothesis of
relatively weak low-income demand (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
z 1971 ).
Certain quality measures (persons per room, availability of
plumbing facilities, urban population densities) also seem likely
10 reflect improvement for low-income households when 1970
census results can be compared with the 1960 figures. Relative-
ly recent Bureau of the Census estimates on housing &dquo;not
meeting specified criteria&dquo;’ show marked overall gains in
housing quality between 1960 and 1968. Table 2 contains an
indication of the gains. Finally, the trend to building abandon-
ments and commercial removals from the housing stock hardly
seem consistent with a &dquo;severe&dquo; shortage interpretation.
If landlords, real estate management firms, and the like have
been faced with a contraction in low-income housing demand,
and the probable prospects of more in the future, what
adjustment responses might be anticipated? Lowry’s (1960)
analysis of filtering points to the obvious mechanism of




SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-23 No. 29, &dquo;The
Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, 1969.&dquo;
a. Housing &dquo;meeting specified criteria&dquo; includes units &dquo;with all basic plumbing
facilities and ... not dilapidated&dquo; (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1969: 56).
point of the Lowry article is to argue that expanding the
housing stock would be a fruitless way to improve housing for
lower-income groups, his analysis can be readily applied to the
case of decreasing demand. The critical factor in the analysis is
the emergence of &dquo;a price-depressing surplus&dquo; (Lowry, 1960:
363).
A brief restatement of the Lowry analysis may be useful.
Three basic costs confront the landlord:
(1) user costs (UC)-heat, janitorial services, other costs of operating
(2) fixed costs (Fcptaxes, insurance, and so on
(3) normal maintenance costs (NQ4Cpoffsets depreciation and obso-
lescence
The first two costs may be viewed as relatively fixed so long as
the units are used to supply housing. The major item of variable
cost for Lowry is maintenance. So long as price covers all three
costs, a given housing unit can be maintained more or less
indefinitely in &dquo;standard quality&dquo; condition. But what happens
when price falls below UC + FC + NMC (Figure 1) as occurs at
T1 ? Reductions will presumably be made in variable mainte-
nance costs, beginning the process of quality erosion. Building
abandonment occurs after T2, when price is no longer sufficient
to cover user costs.
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Figure 1.
The possibility of varying costs in categories (1) and (2) also
needs to be taken into account. Janitorial services can be
reduced; heating provided less abundantly; filth and trash
allowed to accumulate. In extremis, taxes can go unpaid, on the
load to building abandonment. The quickness with which a
building can deteriorate, particularly if longer-run prospects are
unfavorable, can be effectively documented from the experi-
ences in New York City.
The Lowry analysis is primarily in a framework of stable
costs. The upward trend in costs in the past decade also must
have played a role in supplier responses, in addition to the
downward trend in demand. The supposedly nonvariable costs
of taxes, insurance, janitorial wages, and implicit opportunity
costs of capital all rose substantially more. than rents in the
1960s. These types of costs rose 40% or more compared with
the 20% advance in rents.’ The impact of rising costs has been
experienced not only in the privately operated sector of the
housing market, but also among public housing authorities (De
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Leeuw, 1969; Walsh, 1969). They, too, have been compelled by
financial constraints to undermaintain and deteriorate the
housing stock.
The influence of cost increases can be introduced into
Figures 1 a and 1 b by tilting the several cost schedules upward.
This, of course, moves points T1 and TZ forward (toward the
y-axis) in time. Deterioration occurs earlier and at a more rapid
pace. The only respite occurs between the time undermainte-
nance begins and the erosion of quality commences.
FIVE POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO
MORE QUALITY HOUSING
The paradox of improving housing standards and the accom-
panying incentives to deteriorate the standing stock of housing
poses an unusually difficult dilemma for central cities. The
process of family upgrading of housing as income improves
leaves in its wake newly emerging areas of deterioration and
blight. At the same time, numerous higher-income households
are crossing the urban frontier to suburbia. The emerging areas
of deterioration and blight become focal points for the housing
of low-income housing units. Stopping or slowing the escape
from poverty might serve to stem the spreading deterioration
process; but such is hardly within the power of cities nor an
acceptable goal of rational policy. Alternatively, heavily sub-
sidized new units to house low-income families might be
pursued with large-scale funding. But traditional low-income
units on such lines have come under heavy attack; moreover,
this process-by adding to the emergent price-depressing sur-
plus-seems likely to accelerate the deterioration of the current
standing stock.
What are the alternatives for improving the quantity of
quality units for low-income households? Five potential ap-
proaches can be distinguished: (1) new construction, (2)
anti-deterioration subsidies, (3) direct income subsidies, (4)
development of lower-cost construction methods, and (5)
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demolition. Each of these strategies needs to be evaluated in the
context of the housing market processes of shrinking poverty
demands and expanding deterioration incentives.
New construction: The building of many new housing units
of current high-quality standards is the obvious, intuitively
appealing approach. It is also expensive; how expensive depends
on characteristics of the program adopted. The larger the
fraction of new units directed to low-income households, the
more expensive the program is likely to be in terms of federal
funding requirements. If one sought to eliminate all substandard
units, such a program might involve $90 billion to $120 billion
of direct construction expense (i.e., excluding land acquisition
costs, demolition of existing structures, and the like). These
estimates are based on a cost of $20,000 per unit multiplied by
the &dquo;not meeting specified criteria&dquo; figure of some 4.5 million
units derivable from Table 2 and the 6 million units of low- and
moderate-income housing projected in the report of the
President’s Committee on Urban Housing (1968: 3). On a
ten-year basis, these direct costs would involve an annual
expenditure rate of $9 billion to $12 billion. This would be
enough to eliminate &dquo;official&dquo; poverty based on 1969 and 1970
estimates of the &dquo;aggregate income deficit&dquo; of $10.7 billion and
$11.4 billion respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971: 7).
This program would not be a one-time effort, for the
standing stock would continue to deteriorate and deteriorate at
an accelerated rate. The newly constructed units would also
begin to deteriorate with the passage of time. At what rates
would new substandard units be produced? The rates would
presumably be rather higher than before the construction
program began and price-depressing surpluses emerged (or
became anticipated). It would be useful to know something
about the supply function for deteriorating units.
If the additions to the housing stock were sufficiently rapid
to more than offset the accelerated rates of deterioration,
somewhat better-quality units (on the average) would become
available at somewhat lower average prices. But the improve-
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ment would not be maintained unless continuous injections of
publicly supported new construction were to occur.6 6 Net
improvement depends on the maintenance of a housing market
disequilibrium; and even continuous injections at a steady rate
might not be a sufficient condition if deterioration rates were
stimulated to expand to a compensating extent. The ultimate
logic of repeated public construction programs might even be to
eliminate private suppliers altogether, a situation that seems to
be at hand in some segments of the New York housing market.
An alternative housing program, less expensive from a public
funding viewpoint, might be devised based on new construction
subsidies to middle-income families. If, for example, a $2,000
subsidy would stimulate the building of a new unit by a
nonpoor household, the same aggregate impact on housing
supply might be achieved at one-tenth the public outlay.’ The
stimulus to deterioration via market filtering cannot be avoided,
however. The distribution of deterioration may be different,
ranging more widely throughout the housing market. If con-
centrations of deterioration are lessened, perhaps the emergence
of newly substandard units may be slowed. But this is all rather
speculative in the absence of knowledge about the empirical
relationships.
Anti-deterioration subsidies: Stemming the rate of housing
deterioration through some form of subsidy has a certain appeal
given the deterioration-accelerating characteristics of new con-
struction programs. From the viewpoint of central cities, the
stopping and reversal of the deterioration of existing units
would seem particularly desirable. Lebergott ( 1970), in a recent
provocative article, points to the significant gains that a slowing
of the rate of deterioration might accomplish. By lowering the
depreciation rate from 5 to 3% each year, &dquo;we would add
100,000 units to the stock of acceptable housing&dquo; (Lebergott,
1970: 1362). While the validity of this speculative estimate is
difficult to judge, there does appear to be considerable merit in
his conclusion: &dquo;If the housing of the poor is to be improved
significantly, therefore, we must keep the stock of low-income
housing from sliding downhill at its present rate.&dquo;
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Devising an operational subsidy to encourage the mainte-
nance of existing structures presents a number of complexities.
Both demand and supply deterioration are possible. Units used
by low-income households are subject to higher rates of
deterioration; and landlords, both private and public, face
financial constraints that promote deterioration. Among the
complexities faced by an anti-deterioration program are the
problems of (1) defining the components of quality mainte-
nance, (2) ensuring that subsidies are linked to performance at
noninflated prices, and (3) coping with neighborhood effects.
A general subsidy to property owners to maintain &dquo;quality&dquo;
is plagued by the inexactness (multiple dimensions?) of the
meaning of housing quality. Four more or less distinguishable
aspects can be indicated:
(1) plumbing-major appliances
(2) aesthetics maintenance (painting, cleanliness, and so on)
(3) structural integrity
(4) tenant behavior
Suppose that some sort of maintenance standards can be
established for items 1-3. To whom should subsidies be
extended? From the viewpoint of fiscal efficiency, one would
like to argue for subsidies (tax relief, incentive payments) for
those who would not otherwise maintain their properties. But is
there any way of identifying such landlords? Considerable
naivete would be required to accept property-owner declara-
tions of nonintent. Some limitations of the program’s scope
might be attainable by restricting subsidies to units in which
&dquo;poor&dquo; tenants live. (Under such a restriction, landlords might
even vie for poverty tenants.)
Lebergott (1970: 1362) proposes an ingenious incentive plan
to reward &dquo;good&dquo; tenant behavior. &dquo;Financial rewards would be
given to any public housing tenant who generates less than
average maintenance and repair costs.... Those who create
above average costs could continue to go on their merry way.&dquo;
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The proposal is limited to public housing, &dquo;since private owners
known their own self-interest&dquo; and Lebergott (1970: 1365)
seems willing to accept the situation that &dquo;many private
investors have abandoned hope for central-city multiple-unit
ownership.&dquo; Perhaps this is so, but this means a very dreary
housing future for the central city. Might not an altering of
financial incentives have some impact in altering decisions to
abandon the city?
The administrative difficulties of providing subsidies to
maintain the existing stock of housing need to be recognized.
An administratively easier, but less direct, route might be
feasible through an expanded rent supplement program for
low-income households. A concern about rent supplem6nts is
that they may lead to a bidding up of rents, particularly in the
shorter run, without accompanying supplier improvements in
housing quality. That quality will not improve seems debatable
without further evidence. Muth (1969: 199, 278) finds that
income has a significant impact in reducing the percentage of
substandard housing, reporting implicit income elasticities
ranging from -1.77 to -4.6. &dquo;In general, a 10 percent increase
in the incomes of a family in a given area reduces the fraction of
housing units which are poor quality ... by about a third&dquo;
(Muth, 1970: 28). While rent supplements do not constitute a
general increase in income, there seems to be no reason to
anticipate that the market processes behind Muth’s findings
would not be operative for rent supplements.
The more critical difficulties are twofold. First, rent supple-
ments, like the general reduction in poverty in the 1960s, may
serve to depress further the demand for low-income units,
hastening the deterioration of some components of the central-
city housing stock. Further exodus to the suburbs may also be
stimulated, although this trend, if it includes a greater propor-
tion of nonwhite households, may be helpful in any effort to
reduce residential segregation.8 8 Second, rent subsidies-and
specific subsidies more generally-constitute no more than
&dquo;second-best&dquo; uses of resources if the basic objective is to
alleviate poverty. The question is: Do we want to help housing
or households?
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Income subsidies: If the emphasis shifts to eliminating the
low incomes of poverty households, the program of appeal for
economists ought to be direct income-maintenance transfers.
Housing quality can be expected to rise, presuming low-income
groups constitute the major component of demand for low-
quality housing. As Muth (1969: 126) has observed, &dquo;There is
nothing very novel in an economist’s suggesting that poor-qual-
ity housing is purchased by low-income households.&dquo; But he
also notes: &dquo;Most arguments commonly given ... ignore the
basic cause of poor housing quality, which is the poverty or
low-income of its inhabitants&dquo; (Muth, 1969: 115).
The obvious criticism of income transfers is that generalized
purchasing power can and will be spent on many other things
(cars, TV sets, clothes, food, medical care) than housing
directly. Such alternative uses of funds, however, may have
broader effects in improving the quality of the recipients’ lives.
It is these broader dimensions that may really matter-or rather
their absence-in the decline of neighborhoods and in the
attempt to maintain urban housing of stable or improving
quality.
Lower-cost construction methods: The benefits of cost
reduction in residential construction have long been sought.
Whether &dquo;Operation Breakthrough&dquo; places us any closer to the
achievement of significant cost reductions in urban construction
remains to be seen. In a sense, a major cost breakthrough was
achieved in the 1960s with the rapid expansion of mobile
homes. The location of these &dquo;cheap&dquo; units has been largely at
the urban periphery on marginal land. Whether they can be
stacked, or combined in other ways, to make efficient use of
higher-valued central-city land is yet to be demonstrated.
The cost breakthrough of mobile homes hardly represents a
significant technological step, but rather a shift in consumer
acceptance. This underscores an often-ignored dimension in
urban housing: the insistence on the production of high-quality
new units. The emphasis on middle-class construction standards,
as Downs (1969) points out, effectively limits the number and
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variety of new housing units that can be produced. The choice
of housing to serve low-income families is accordingly circum-
scribed.
One is almost tempted to argue that the setting of high-qual-
ity construction standards is part of the American urban
problem. Older housing units wear out in a physical sense at a
disconcertingly slow pace. They are expensive to tear down and
relegate to the scrap pile. A consequence is that cities become
&dquo;locked into&dquo; historical land use patterns that too readily wear
down (but not out) into central-city slums. Perhaps the shortest
route to lower-cost construction is through the acceptance of
cheaper, less durable units.
Demolition: Demolition of unsatisfactory units in cities
completes the cataloguing of alternatives. While demolition may
hardly seem to be a policy unless new units are built to replace
those tom down, Forrester (1969) has argued that demolition
introduces just the disequilibrium that urban systems need.
Otherwise cities cannot avoid the fate of being the center of
gravity for the poorest households. The building of new
low-income units on vacated land only serves to block the entry
of industry into the central city and to reduce pressures for
population redistribution throughout the SMSA.
CONCLUSION
Population redistributions within SMSAs are the key to
residential desegregation and, perhaps even more importantly,
to job availabilities and to coping with racial imbalance in
education. It is easy, although probably,not correct, to attribute
a large part of the urban housing problem to segregation in
housing markets. Segregation in this context means restriction
of access to parts of the housing market based on race, not on
economic criteria. A recent study by the author (Zelder, 1970a)
indicates that economic circumstances may play a considerably
larger role in urban white/nonwhite residential patterns than the
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usual perceptions suggest. The Taeubers (1965), for example,
find very high rates of segregation; but their basic index is a
faulty measure of segregation.9 9
For the four cities investigated in my research (Chicago;
Kalamazoo and Detroit, Mich.; and Rochester, N.Y.) the
&dquo;results obtained suggest that a minimum of 30 to 50 percent
of racial patterns in housing can be attributed to differences in
the economic status of households&dquo; (Zelder, 1970a: 94).
Economic differences, moreover, are probably understated in
this investigation because of the reliance on the 1960 census
data on incomes. A number of factors contributes to the
underestimation of white/nonwhite differentials in economic
status. Among the factors involved are the underenumeration of
nonwhite males of prime labor-force age, the exclusion of
important property incomes in the reported data, the influence
of financial asset accumulations, and the importance of perma-
nent income in housing expenditures. 1 0
The role of asset accumulations is an underexplored element
in the ability to acquire housing. Since nonwhite households are
considerably younger than white households, their expected
asset holdings are likely to be significantly smaller. Despite
popular illusion to the contrary, nonwhite households exhibit
considerably lower rates of car ownership than white house-
holds even after households are classified within census income
categories. Data on households without cars from the 1960
census are contained in Appendix Table A-2. Cars clearly
constitute an important complement in the consumption of
housing more removed from city centers.
Will relative income gains for nonwhites serve to lessen the
extent of residential segregation? I had hoped to present some
preliminary estimates of the impact of the 1960s on the
measures of segregation utilized in my study of 1960 residential
patterns. Unfortunately, the necessary tract detail from the
1970 census is not yet available. Casual empiricism, a risky but
inevitable temptation, suggests that nothing dramatic occurred
in the magnitude of market exclusion and market segregation
measures.
Yet how much of a change might be anticipated based on a
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rise from 52% to 63% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1969: 14) in
the relative income relationship (Negro and other race income
as a percentage of white income)? One might anticipate only a
relatively small change, especially if asset holdings are impor-
tant. Even full equalization of current income flows would not
eliminate household wealth differentials. An alternative, less
expensive, and perhaps politically more feasible, approach than
eliminating all differences in economic status might be accom-
plished by direct subsidies to households living in residentially
integrated neighborhoods. 1 1
The costs of &dquo;a ’Homesteading Act’ for pioneering types of
the twentieth century&dquo; (Zelder, 1970c: 275) might not be too
large relative to projected expenditures for other social welfare-
social reform programs. If the four-city 1960 average market
segregation coefficients-10.1 % for whites and 69.5% for
nonwhites-are applied to 1970 metropolitan area data, the
required movement of households to achieve residential desegre-
gation would involve the redirection of approximately 3.5
million white and 3.5 million nonwhite households.
What sort of subsidy might be required to achieve this
redistribution of population: $1,000 per household; $2,000? If
these are appropriate upper and lower limits, the initiation cost
would fall between $7 billion and $14 billion. Or perhaps it
could be argued that the costs would be halved, since only one
of a pair of households might need to be induced to move; the
household of the other color (whether white or nonwhite)
would be forced, in a &dquo;musical-chairs&dquo; sense, to live in the
vacated unit of the moving household. In any event, informa-
tion is needed about the elasticity of prejudice functions. The
social returns to such knowledge could be considerable; how it
might be obtained, however, is something else.
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APPENDIX TABLE A-1 1
RENT AND COST-OF-LIVING CHANGES
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer
Price Index.
a. November 1963 = 100 d. 1969
b. December 1963 = 100 e. 1970 ratio to index base year
c. February 1965 = 100
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APPENDIX TABLE A-2
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS LACKING AUTOMOBILES
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census of Housing: 1960. Vol, II,
Metropolitan Housing, Parts 2, 3, and 5. Unpublished Tabulations for Kalamazoo and
Rochester.
a. none reported without automobiles in census household sample.
NOTES
1. In 1970 a reversal of the downward trend of 436,000 was experienced,
reflecting the impact of the recession.
2. The 1970 ratio of rents to all prices fell to .916 of the 1960 ratio.
3. See Appendix Table A-1 for these city data.
4. Housing "meeting specified criteria" includes units "with all basic plumbing
facilities and ... not dilapidated" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1969: 56).
5. The consumer price index categories are suggestive of the extent of the
average increases experienced from 1960 to 1970: property insurance rates, +47.5%;
house maintenance and repairs, +46.6%; mortgage interest rates, +38.6%; property
taxes, +39.5% (in the seven-year period 1963-1970). Opportunity costs of capital
rose significantly more than the reported mortgage rate index: Aaa corporate bonds
averaged 8.04% in 1970 compared with 4.41% in 1960, an increase of 82.3% over the
decade.
6. Rising incomes would, of course, permit quality improvements to be
sustained; but that is because incomes are higher, not because subsidized construction
has occurred. With no change in incomes, the preexistent quantity-quality equilib-
rium would tend to be restored.
7. A program along these lines was suggested by the author (Zelder, 1970b) in a
draft statement to the Kalamazoo City Commission. Welfeld (1970) has also
proposed the merits of a middle-income housing subsidy.
8. See the final section for a discussion of segregation/desegregation implica-
tions.
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9. The conceptual and analytical defects of their index are dealt with in Zelder
(1970c).
10. See Zelder (1970c: 266-270, 1970a: 99-100) for a fuller discussion of the
role of these factors.
11. Myron Ross (forthcoming), a colleague at Western Michigan, and the author
(Zelder, 1970c) have proposed such subsidy arrangements.
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